Side view of young woman sitting at dining table, drinking a glass of water and sorting out her home finances and bills.

We welcome the opportunity to respond to Ofwat’s draft determinations on water companies’ Outcome Delivery Incentives (ODIs) for 2025-26, and the potential impact of these decisions on customers’ bills from 2027.

Summary

The ODI determinations matter to customers because they affect the money returned through, or added to, bills and signal whether companies are held to account for service and environmental outcomes. This is particularly important when affordability, fairness and trust are under pressure. CCW’s Water Matters 2026 found that only 63% of customers agreed that water and sewerage charges were affordable and 44% considered them fair. Our 2025–26 Household Complaints Report recorded a 129% rise in complaints from customers saying their bills had become unaffordable.

In this context, CCW recommends that in its final determinations Ofwat must:

  • show the likely household and non-household bill effects of the ODI determinations, explain how these interact with cost adjustments, and make clear what the figures do and do not mean for individual customers
  • explain the purpose and operation of the OAM and ASM, including how they change company-level financial consequences and whether incentives remain strong enough to improve service
  • publish the evidence, calculations, scores and adjustments behind its decisions, linked to the customer and environmental outcomes concerned
  • allow deferrals only where they protect customers from avoidable bill spikes, preserve the full incentive value, and are transparent and fair to the customers who pay now or later

For discharge permit compliance, CCW accepts this year’s reported results and payments as an interim decision, given the current sampling limitations. Ofwat should strengthen the evidence and sampling arrangements before future incentive payments are set, and consult on any proposed change without leaving companies without a reliable incentive for compliance.

CCW is concerned that the OAM may weaken the link between company performance and its financial consequences. Ofwat’s draft shows net sector ODI payments of -£335.752 million before the OAM and -£239.965 million after it. The OAM therefore reduces the aggregate adjustment by about £95.8 million. This is a material change in the amount returned through bills and warrants a clearer explanation of its company-level and customer effects. Ofwat should assess and report whether the OAM and the ASM’s sharing thresholds leave companies with a sufficiently strong incentive to improve service.

Our response

Customer bill impacts

The sector-wide net revenue effect in Ofwat’s overview is useful, but it can conceal very different outcomes across the 16 companies and does not by itself tell customers what has happened to service. Customers need a clear line of sight between performance, the financial adjustment and the effect on bills. Clear, credible explanations of what customers are paying for, what service they received and what follows from poor performance are essential to fairness and rebuilding trust.

This matters in the current context: Water Matters 2026 found record low agreement that charges are affordable (63%) and fair (44%), alongside a fall in average trust to 6.07 out of 10. The 2025–26 Household Complaints Report also recorded a 129% increase in complaints from customers saying their bills had become unaffordable. Water Voice Accountability Sessions also echo customers’ concerns about billing communication and their ability to understand bills and the support available.

In its final determinations, Ofwat should bring the average household bill impacts in Table 1 of the sector overview together with the company-level revenue adjustments, in a prominent, accessible explanation. It should explain separately, where the evidence allows, the implications for household and non-household customers. The sector-level average must not be presented as if every customer’s bill changes by that amount. Actual bills depend on each company’s charging arrangements and, for non-household customers, their circumstances and charges. Where a reliable customer-level estimate is not possible, Ofwat should say so and explain why. This would help customers see how the decision affects them and compare the financial outcome with the service delivered.

Ofwat should also explain the combined effect of the ODI determinations and the separate cost adjustment process. Both can change allowed revenue and are being considered on a similar timetable. Customers should be able to see the overall bill effect, while understanding which part arises from ODI performance and which from cost adjustments, and what outcomes each mechanism is intended to deliver. This will make the relationship between service, investment and bills easier to understand.

Ofwat should also be explicit about the purpose of each financial adjustment and who it is intended to benefit. In the final company determinations and a clear sector-level customer summary, it should distinguish adjustments that return money through lower allowed revenue from compensation paid directly to customers. An ODI adjustment is not necessarily direct compensation to the customers who experienced poor service, and it does not undo the harm caused. Ofwat should explain the bill effect, the performance outcome behind it, and the action the company must take to put service right. This will help customers understand what the adjustment achieves and what it does not.

Ofwat’s interventions

CCW supports the following Ofwat interventions because they protect the integrity of the measures, ensure decisions are based on reliable evidence, or avoid rewarding performance that has not been demonstrated:

  • removing Yorkshire Water’s leakage outperformance reward. Ofwat identified material non-compliance in the water-balance component of the leakage measure, so removing the reported payment protects the measure’s integrity
  • deferring the determination on United Utilities’ reported leakage performance while it examines the additional data supplied by the company. No leakage reward should be confirmed until the evidence is sufficiently reliable
  • CCW agrees that, for Hafren Dyfrdwy and South Staffs Water, using the original PCC baseline or methodology for this year is a reasonable way to preserve comparability while it checks both companies’ revised figures
  • correcting the bathing water PCL error because companies should not be penalised against a target that could not be realistically achieved. Ofwat should show each company’s before-and-after calculation and make clear that the correction changes the incentive calculation, not the bathing water outcome itself. Customers need separate reporting of the actual bathing water results and the improvement still required
  • removing biodiversity outperformance payments where the baseline was not established through the site visits required by the performance commitment
    3.6 For discharge permit compliance, CCW recognises Ofwat’s reliance on Environment Agency advice that the reported 2025-26 results are the best performance the water-only companies are likely to have achieved under the current sampling regime. We accept retaining this year’s reported payments as an interim decision

However, incomplete sampling may mean actual compliance is worse than reported. Ofwat should strengthen the evidence and sampling arrangements before confirming future rewards, and explain how it will assure itself that the results are sufficiently reliable.

Ofwat should consult on any proposed change to the measure. Removing or suspending the commitment should not leave companies without a reliable incentive to comply with discharge permits.

Customer experience measures (‘MeXs’)

CCW supports Ofwat’s proposed checks:

  • C-MeX and D-MeX results against its survey agent’s data, applying the stated
    sample-size rules
  • BR-MeX results against market data and B-MeX (Wales) results where the sample is not statistically robust
  • the Welsh business customer measure against the survey evidence

CCW recommends that Ofwat publish the adjustments, sample sizes and resulting company scores in the final company determinations, with a concise explanation in its sector overview. This goes beyond carrying out the proposed checks: the published information should let household, developer and business customers see which aspects of experience drove each payment and how the score was calculated. Ofwat should also explain how these experience scores relate to wider service performance, so that a high score on one measure does not obscure serious failures elsewhere. This transparency will make the decisions easier to scrutinise and help customers judge whether the financial consequence is fair.

Application of the ASM and OAM

The ASM and OAM are intended to protect against material differences between actual company or sector performance and the assumptions used to set the price control. These mechanisms matter to customers because they determine how much of the financial consequences of performance is reflected in bills and how much risk is borne by companies or shared across the sector. They may limit volatility, but their design must not make it difficult for customers to see whether their own company has delivered or whether its reward or penalty reflects its performance.

Ofwat’s draft shows net sector ODI payments of -£335.752 million after MeX payments and the ASM, before the OAM, and -£239.965 million after the OAM. The OAM therefore reduces the aggregate price-control adjustment by about £95.8 million. Less revenue is consequently returned through bills in aggregate, although the timing and company-level effects vary. The ASM also shares ODI outcomes above its thresholds, reducing companies’ marginal exposure to very large rewards or penalties. These arrangements may limit bill and return volatility, but they can also blunt incentives at the margins and make accountability less clear.

Ofwat should publish the company-by-company effect of the ASM and OAM, including the bill implications where they can be estimated, and assess whether the resulting incentives remain strong enough to improve service. The explanation should show customers what would have happened before and after each mechanism and why the adjustment is consistent with the purpose of the price control.

Deferral of ODI payments and penalties

CCW accepts that a deferral may be appropriate where it demonstrably protects customers from an avoidable bill spike and provides a smoother overall bill profile. However, deferring an underperformance payment can weaken the link between poor performance and its financial consequence, and leave future customers paying for a failure experienced by customers today. Customers need confidence that deferral is being used to manage bill timing, not to disguise poor performance or reduce the incentive to put things right.

Deferrals should therefore be limited, time-bound and reported separately from the original ODI result. Ofwat should publish the full schedule of current and brought-forward deferrals, identify the performance commitment involved, and confirm that the full value is preserved. Before approving a deferral, Ofwat should assess who pays and who benefits, including whether the customers who bear the later bill effect are likely to benefit from the service improvement. A deferred payment should not be converted into an RCV adjustment without a clear assessment of these effects. This is a matter of fairness between customers paying now and in the future, as well as of maintaining an effective incentive.

Company-by-company comments

Table 1 sets out CCW’s company-specific recommendations on the draft determinations. Where we support Ofwat’s proposed treatment, we say so. Where we ask Ofwat to make a change or provide further explanation, the recommendation is stated in the company comment.

Company Our view
Affinity Water We agree with removing the unsupported biodiversity reward. The final determination should report its effect separately.
Anglian Water The final determinations should show the commitments and experience (‘Mex’) scores behind the reward.
Dŵr Cymru We agree with applying one third now to spread the bill impact. The final determinations should show the £33.427m future schedule and explain service failures, so deferral does not mask current performance.
Hafren Dyfrdwy We agree with keeping the original PCC baseline pending evidence.
Northumbrian Water The final determinations should more clearly explain which outcomes and experience (‘Mex’) scores justify this material payment.
Portsmouth Water The final determinations should show the underlying results as a near-zero net result does not mean all measures were on target.
SES Water The final determination should show the original and adjusted B-MeX/BR-MeX scores with a clear explanation for business customers to show how these affect the penalty.
Severn Trent Water We support removing the unsupported biodiversity reward and note that deferral does not offset failure.
South East Water We agree with applying one third now. The final determination should show the £9.916m schedule, service failures, and combined bill effect.
South Staffs Water We agree with keeping the original PCC methodology. The final determination should show the service outcomes behind rewards and penalties.
South West Water We agree with applying one third now. The final determination should show the £29.093m schedule and explain the failures behind the penalty.
Bristol Water We agree with applying one third now. The final determination should show the £2.955m schedule and explain the failures behind the penalty.
Southern Water The final determination should explain the poor C-MeX/D-MeX results, required recovery and the customer bill effect.
Thames Water We agree with applying more underperformance now than the company proposed to ensure the incentive effect is not weakened. The final determination should show the £66.721m schedule and link failures to remedial action.
United Utilities We agree with holding the leakage decision until evidence is reliable.
Wessex Water The final determination should separate prior-year and deferred adjustments from current performance.
Yorkshire Water We agree with removing the leakage reward and correcting the bathing water PCL separately; the reduction is not compensation or proof of improved service.